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SUBJ HIGHLIGHTS: POST-MEETING DISCUSSIONS, MARCH 12, 1972

(SALT TWO - 406)

1. SUMMARY. POST-MEETING CONVERSATIONS INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS OF THE SOVIET VIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF EQUALITY AND OF SHCHUKIN'S STATEMENT TODAY ON SYSTEMS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET VIEW OF CONCEPT OF EQUALITY. KLOSSON (TO GRINEVSKY, A-551) SAID THAT GRINEVSKY AT LUNCHEON THE DAY BEFORE, HAD RULED OUT SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF ANY ARITHMETICAL EQUALITY BETWEEN THE CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS OF THE TWO SIDES. GENERAL TRUSOV TODAY HAD SAID THAT IF ALL STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WERE LOCATED ONLY ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF EACH SIDE, THE PROBLEM OF LIMITATIONS WOULD BE SIMPLER, BUT TRUSOV HAD MADE NO REFERENCE TO WHAT LEVEL THE SOVIET SIDE HAD IN MIND. KLOSSON ASKED, SPEAKING THEORETICALLY, IF THE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS OF BOTH SIDES WERE DEPLOYED ONLY ON THE NATIONAL TERRITORY OF EACH SIDE, DID THE USSR THEN ENVISAGE NUMERICAL EQUALITY. GRINEVSKY SAID THE SOVIET UNION WOULD STILL WANT THE NUMERICAL LEVELS SET BY THE INTERIM

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AGREEMENT.

3. EARLE (TO GRINEVSKY, A-551) THEN ASKED HOW THIS WAS CONSISTENT WITH EQUALITY, AND GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT IT WAS NOT EQUALITY THAT THE SOVIETS WERE SEEKING BUT EQUAL SECURITY. FURTHER QUESTIONING LED GRINEVSKY TO SAY THAT THE NUMERICAL IMBALANCES WERE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE EQUAL SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC POSITION OF THE TWO SIDES AND "OTHER FACTORS" INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THIRD COUNTRIES AND "THE SITUATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES." WHEN PRESSED FOR A MEANING OF "THE SITUATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES," GRINEVSKY WAS EVASIVE, BUT SMOLIN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT WHAT WAS MEANT WAS NOT THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES BUT RATHER THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OTHER THAN THOSE ALREADY EXTANT.

4. EARLE ASKED (GRINEVSKY, A-551) IF THE GOAL OF EQUAL SECURITY HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN 1972. GRINEVSKY REPLIED THAT IT HAD. EARLE THEN ASKED IF THERE WAS EQUAL SECURITY THEN, HOW COULD GRINEVSKY JUSTIFY MAINTAINING THE UNBALANCED NUMBERS NOW IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET MIRVING, DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW BOMBER BY THE SOVIETS, AND GIVEN THE SOVIET PROPOSAL, TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS; IN OTHER WORDS, IF THERE WAS EQUAL SECURITY IN 1972 AND DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THEN FAVORED THE SOVIET UNION, HOW COULD GRINEVSKY JUSTIFY MAINTENANCE OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT NUMBERS? GRINEVSKY SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES' MIRV PROGRAM HAD BEEN ACCELERATED SINCE THEN, AND HE THEN FELL BACK ON GEOGRAPHY AND THIRD COUNTRIES. WHEN IT WAS POINTED OUT THAT GEOGRAPHY HAD NOT CHANGED AT ALL AND THE SITUATION IN THIRD COUNTRIES HAD ONLY CHANGED SLIGHTLY, GRINEVSKY BECAME SILENT. (COMMENT: IN CONTEXT OF THE CONVERSATION IT APPEARED THAT GRINEVSKY HAD CHINESE CAPABILITIES PRIMARILY IN MIND.)

5. SYSTEMS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES. NITZE (TO SHCHUKIN, A-549) NOTED THAT SHCHUKIN, IN HIS INTERVENTION TODAY, HAD REFERRED TO "NEW TYPES INCLUDING THOSE BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES," WHICH SEEMED TO COVER NOT ONLY NEW TYPES BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, BUT ALSO CERTAIN NEW TYPES BASED ON PRESENTLY USED PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, AND NITZE ASKED FOR SOME EXAMPLES OF THE LATTER. IN REPLY, SHCHUKIN

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REFERRED FIRST OF ALL TO OFFENSIVE MISSILE SYSTEMS GUIDED THROUGH SATELLITES IN ORBIT. NITZE ASKED WHY SUCH GUIDANCE SYSTEMS WOULD BE MORE DANGEROUS THAN OTHER SYSTEMS WHICH SHCHUKIN HAD PREVIOUSLY SAID COULD BE USED TO ACHIEVE HIGH ACCURACY. SHCHUKIN DID NOT RESPOND TO THAT POINT, BUT DESCRIBED ANOTHER POTENTIAL NEW SYSTEM BASED UPON EXISTING PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, I.E., A MISSILE WHICH MANEUVERED IN THE COSMOS.

6. NITZE ASKED WHETHER SHCHUKIN WAS REFERRING TO A MISSILE WHICH WOULD COMPLETE ONE OR MORE ORBITS IN THE COSMOS. SHCHUKIN SAID NO; SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD BE IN VIOLATION OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY. WHAT HE HAD IN MIND WAS A MISSILE SYSTEM WHICH WOULD MANEUVER IN SPACE AFTER IT HAD LEFT THE ATMOSPHERE. IN RESPONSE TO NITZE'S QUESTIONS, HE SAID SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD DIFFER FROM A MIRV SYSTEM IN THAT THE ENTIRE MISSILE WOULD MANEUVER, NOT JUST THE RVS. NITZE THEN ASKED WHETHER SHCHUKIN WAS REFERRING TO THE FIRST STAGE OF THE MISSILE BOOSTER. SHCHUKIN SAID NO; HE HAD IN MIND ONLY THE FRONT END.

7. NITZE NOTED THAT IN THE ABM TREATY THE SIDES HAD AGREED THAT ALL TEST FLIGHTS WOULD BE RESTRICTED TO AGREED TEST RANGES. A COMPARABLE PROVISION IN A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WOULD RESULT IN THE MISSILE HAVING TO TERMINATE IN AN AGREED RANGE HEAD AND NITZE ASKED WHETHER IT COULD NOT THUS BE CONTROLLED. SHCHUKIN ACKNOWLEDGED THAT NOT ONLY WAS THIS TRUE, BUT THAT A SATELLITE IN SYNCHRONOUS ORBIT AT 36,000 KM OVER THE NORTHERN HEMISPHERE COULD ALSO MONITOR SUCH FLIGHTS.

8. U.S. APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS. TRUSOV (TO ROWNY, A-550) SAID THE SOVIET SIDE FELT SLIGHTED; DURING THE PAST SIX SESSIONS THE U.S. SIDE NOT ONLY HAD FAILED TO RESPOND TO THEIR PROPOSALS, BUT HAD PRESENTED ITS OWN PROPOSALS IN A MANNER WHICH SEEMED TO BE DICTATING TO THE SOVIETS THAT NEGOTIATIONS CAN MOVE FORWARD ONLY IF CERTAIN U.S. CONDITIONS ARE MET. IN RESPONSE, ROWNY POINTED OUT THAT THE U.S. HAD CAREFULLY REVIEWED THE SOVIET OCTOBER 9 DRAFT AGREEMENT AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT IT PROVIDED NO BASIS UPON WHICH TO PROCEED. THE U.S. HAD ALSO CAREFULLY REVIEWED ITS OWN PROPOSALS, HAD REPEATED SOME OF THEM, AND HAD TABLED SEVERAL NEW ONES, ONE OF WHICH WAS TIME-SENSITIVE. JOHNSON

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